While Europe faces its most serious security crisis since the end of the Cold War, South Korea has emerged as a key partner in rebuilding European defense industry capabilities. This presents an opportunity for Germany and South Korea to transform a long-standing economic relationship into an even more strategically significant partnership.

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Germany's turning point

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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 turned the strategic assumptions that had shaped German security policy for decades on their head. Berlin could no longer rely on economic ties to curb Russian aggression, nor could it take peace in Europe for granted. At the same time, uncertainty about the future scope and reliability of U.S. security commitments has intensified the debate over Europe’s ability to defend itself. This has fundamentally altered the political priorities of European nations: defense, deterrence, and industrial resilience are now at the center of Europe’s strategic planning.

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Germany’s response was the “Zeitenwende” (turning point), a historic shift in its foreign and security policy. It included a commitment to strengthen the Bundeswehr, accelerate military procurement, and assume greater responsibility for European security. The scale of this transformation is reflected in rising defense spending. Germany’s total defense spending reached approximately 86.5 billion euros (96.2 billion U.S. dollars) in 2025, while the budget for 2026 amounts to about 108.2 billion euros, including funds from the Bundeswehr Special Fund. This is more than double the level of regular defense spending in 2022.

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But money alone cannot guarantee military readiness. After years of underinvestment, Germany is facing delays in procurement, industrial bottlenecks, and insufficient production capacity. Germany and Europe as a whole must urgently replenish their stocks of ammunition, artillery, armored vehicles, and air defense systems while simultaneously expanding their production capacities to meet the demands of a more dangerous security environment and ensure that European industry can manufacture, maintain, and resupply the equipment necessary for sustainable deterrence. South Korea can play an important role here.

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From arms exports to an industrial partnership

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The South Korean defense industry has demonstrated its ability to combine advanced technology, competitive pricing, and rapid production and delivery. Its significant defense agreements with numerous European countries show that Korean manufacturers are capable of meeting urgent European requirements on a large scale. At a time when European governments are seeking to replenish their military stocks and expand production, these strengths are of strategic importance.

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Accordingly, there is considerable potential for expanded cooperation between Germany and Korea in the defense industry. However, the German market requires a tailored approach. The German defense sector has its own industrial traditions, established supplier networks, procurement structures, and strategic priorities. Entering this market therefore involves more than simply offering competitive products or responding to urgent equipment requirements.

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Korean companies must understand the specific needs of the Bundeswehr, build trust with German industrial partners and procurement authorities, and demonstrate a long-term commitment to the German defense industry. Local partnerships, investments in production and maintenance capabilities, and collaboration with established German suppliers are crucial for establishing a sustainable market presence.

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The challenge—and at the same time the opportunity—lies in going beyond individual export contracts and pursuing a strategy that aligns Korea’s industrial strengths with Germany’s security requirements and industrial priorities, thereby creating lasting added value for both sides.

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A long tradition of German-Korean relations in the defense industry

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A solid foundation already exists for further developing German-Korean relations in the defense industry and transforming them into a strategic partnership in this area. Historically, Germany has played an important role in the development of South Korea’s defense industry through technology transfers and industrial cooperation. German expertise in the fields of naval systems, propulsion technology, gearboxes, and specialty components has contributed to Korea’s military capabilities.

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Cooperation on submarines is a particularly telling example: technology transfers and licensed production helped South Korea build its own capabilities, which the country subsequently further developed through increasingly independent research, development, and manufacturing. This experience offers an important lesson and highlights the long-term value of industrial cooperation and technology transfer.

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Having benefited from German expertise during its industrial development, South Korea is now in a position to contribute advanced defense technologies and manufacturing capabilities to Germany’s “Zeitenwende” (turning point).

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Promising areas for defense industry cooperation

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Considering the specific requirements of the German and broader European defense industries, the most promising areas for cooperation include integrated air and missile defense—particularly multi-layered defense capabilities, interceptor missiles, radar systems, and systems that complement existing platforms such as Patriot, which are now in very limited supply.

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In addition, there is both a need and potential for cooperation in the areas of guided and precision-guided weapons (such as advanced missiles, long-range munitions, and cost-effective precision-guided weapons), counter-unmanned aerial systems (Counter-UAS), unmanned and autonomous systems, as well as artillery, rocket launchers, and ammunition.

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Korean investments in production facilities in Germany could help alleviate capacity bottlenecks and integrate Korean manufacturers more closely into the European defense industry ecosystem. German companies, for their part, could contribute specialized technologies, components, technical expertise, and access to established industrial networks.

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Joint ventures, local production, and carefully designed technology transfer agreements could shorten supply chains and support the operational readiness of the Bundeswehr and other European armed forces, while German companies could expand their international partnerships and gain access to additional manufacturing capacity.

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Where interests align, both sides could also pursue opportunities in third-country markets. Competition between German and Korean companies for international contracts will remain a reality. However, competition and cooperation are not mutually exclusive; both can be integral components of a strategic partnership that should focus on identifying areas where closer cooperation can generate greater added value and better results than either side could achieve on its own.

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The political foundations of industrial cooperation

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Cooperation in the defense industry cannot be treated like an ordinary commercial venture. Decisions regarding investment, technology transfer, production capacity, and procurement have direct implications for national security and often span many years, if not decades. Companies are unlikely to commit significant resources if procurement priorities remain unpredictable, regulations are uncertain, or political support can be withdrawn with every change in government.

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Since cooperation in the defense industry cannot be separated from the broader security relations between Germany and South Korea, both countries should embed this cooperation within a more comprehensive bilateral strategic partnership. This requires sustained political commitment on both sides. Governments cannot eliminate commercial risks. However, they can create a stable political framework within which companies can make informed long-term decisions.

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Establishment of a task force for the defense industry

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A practical step would be to establish a regular, high-level German-Korean task force for the defense industry. Despite a long history of technological and industrial cooperation, bilateral relations in the defense industry have so far largely developed through individual procurement programs, technology transfers, and partnerships at the corporate level.

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As relations in the defense industry enter a new era, a dedicated Korean-German defense industry task force could create a more structured platform connecting government agencies, defense contractors, research institutions, and technology companies.

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The task force could set priorities for joint research and development, industrial investment, local manufacturing, and supply chain cooperation, while also addressing regulatory challenges in the areas of procurement, export controls, certification, industrial security, and interoperability. It could also facilitate partnerships between established defense contractors and innovative small and medium-sized enterprises as well as startups, and help translate new technologies into practical industrial programs.

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Such a framework would strengthen bilateral coordination while supporting the German defense industry and wider European requirements.

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Transforming a turning point into a lasting partnership

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Germany and South Korea have already demonstrated what technology transfers and industrial cooperation can achieve. The next step is to build on these experiences and forge a partnership based on reciprocity, shared responsibility, and a long-term strategic goal.

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In this way, this new era can become more than just a turning point in German security policy. It can also mark the beginning of a new chapter in German-Korean relations—a chapter that strengthens European deterrence and transforms a long-standing economic relationship into a lasting strategic partnership.

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Dr. Eric J. Ballbach is a Korea Foundation Fellow in the Asia Research Group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). His research focuses on the foreign and security policies of North and South Korea, particularly on relations between the EU, NATO, and Korea; European-Korean cooperation in the defense industry; the sanctions regime against North Korea; and North Korea’s military modernization.