By Lukas Stock

Most Iraqis interact with militias on a daily basis. There are dozens of them in Iraq. The militias have hundreds of thousands of fighters, go by names like Kata'ib Hezbollah or the Badr Organization, and make a lot of money. For example, through checkpoints, can earn up to 100,000 US dollars a day—that is, through bribes and tolls. It’s a real nuisance if you want to travel from city to city in Iraq.

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The majority of the militias are Shiite Muslims, as are Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and the largest parliamentary bloc in Iraq. However, many of the militias take their orders from another power: the Shiite regime in Iran. Many of the leaders of today’s Iraqi militias were trained in Iran and still see themselves as part of the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel, the U.S., and their allies. This is a source of concern for the Iraqi government, which would prefer to focus on economic growth. To achieve this goal, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi visited Berlin last Tuesday and met with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. The Iraqi prime minister proposed that Iraq could supply more crude oil to Germany, while Iraq would like to purchase German technology and industrial equipment.

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The Iraqi prime minister also wants to build a “partnership” with its wealthy neighbor, Saudi Arabia. But on September 10, drones launched from Iraq attacked the vital east-west pipeline in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had been using the pipeline to circumvent Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Satellite images show black spots in the desert. A lifeline for the oil-rich nation has been severed. In initial statements, the Saudis blamed the militias in Iraq. An Iraqi broadcaster reported that a Saudi official, furious over the attacks, had threatened the Iraqi government with retaliation. And even though four of the most radical militias denied involvement in the attack in a statement, such attacks undermine the prime minister’s trade plans, through which he aims to lift his country out of poverty. According to a 2024 study 70% of Iraqis also perceive Iran's influence as a threat. Although most of them, like the pro-Iranian militias, belong to the Shia faith. Many Iraqis also accuse the militias of being responsible for the deaths of 600 anti-government demonstrators during the 2019 protests. And they find the numerous checkpoints humiliating.

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The militias are well aware of the allegations. They argue that they cannot disband and must carry weapons as long as foreign troops remain in the country. However, the Iraqi government has negotiated for the remaining international and American troops to withdraw by September 30. The Iraqi government hopes that the troop withdrawal will lead to greater sovereignty.

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Starting in 2014, Western governments deployed several thousand soldiers to support Iraq in the fight against ISIS. Among them, the U.S. provided the largest force, with approximately 5,000 soldiers. Germany also sent 150 soldiers starting in 2016 to train Kurdish forces for the fight against ISIS. Today, however, all that remains of ISIS are sleeper cells, which the Iraqi government considers such a minor threat that it can handle them on its own. Most of the foreign troops have already left in recent years anyway. Only around 200 American soldiers remained, stationed in the north—far from the areas populated by Shiites.

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As foreign troops withdraw, the government now wants all militias to submit to state authority—just as foreign troops are supposed to do by September 30. However, it has been clear since early September that this won’t work. On September 6, the government had actually planned to hold negotiations with four major militias that had opposed the reform, according to an Iraqi media outlet. But one of the militias did not show up. The government has now postponed the negotiations—without setting a date for new talks. Is there now a risk, as one analyst on Al-Jazeera fears, that Iran, with its militias, will take over power in Iraq? Now that the country is once again on its own?

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One argument against this is that no one knows for sure whether the state wouldn’t actually benefit more if some militiamen remained outside the government, as they have until now. After all, they could cause more damage within the state than outside it. According to an Iraqi media report, the prime minister wants to place 35,000 militiamen into government forces—including the elite Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). The CTS receives funding from the U.S. and is trained by American special forces. However, an analyst at the Washington Institute argued back in 2024 that Iranian forces were increasingly undermining the CTS. In 2023, for example, the CTS paid $12 million to a company affiliated with the Kata’ib Hezbollah network. The CTS had also trained militiamen in combat methods they had learned from the Americans.

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But it gets even more complicated. Formally speaking, the Iraqi militias are already largely under state command. Most of them belong to the so-called PMF, led by Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh and Chief of Staff Abu Fadak. They, in turn, are formally subordinate to the prime minister. Formally—that’s an adjective worth remembering. Also the name Abu Fadak, who, in addition to his role as chief of staff, has another identity. But first, it’s worth taking a look back at the past—specifically to 2014, when the PMF was founded.

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At that time, hundreds of pickup trucks carrying fighters were rolling toward Baghdad. The black flag of the terrorist organization ISIS flew above them. They had overrun the Iraqi army in the north. The Iraqi army consists mainly of Shiites. However, ISIS fighters follow a radical Sunni ideology and view Shiites as heretics. They massacred Shiite civilians and soldiers who had previously surrendered in droves. Panic broke out in the Shiite south of Iraq. ISIS threatened to seize power.

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During this chaos, the senior Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa: All physically able-bodied Iraqis should arm themselves and join the fight against ISIS. They were actually supposed to join the army, which was in the process of collapsing. Instead, thousands of men lined up to join militias. These militias united under the name Quwwāt al-Hashd ash-Shaʿbī, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF won the battle against ISIS—together with the army and an international coalition, for which the Americans also returned to Iraq.

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The PMF still exists today. It most recently received a budget of approximately 3.5 billion U.S. dollars from the government. The PMF consists of a loose network of about 73 brigades provided by the various militias. There are Sunni and even Christian brigades, but most are Shia—and often follow Iran’s radical ideology. For example, the 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades. They belong to Kata’ib Hezbollah.

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This leads to paradoxical situations where the word formally regains its importance. For while the Iraqi government cooperates with the U.S., and the PMF is formally under the authority of the Iraqi government, PMF brigades are fighting the U.S.

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In 2024, the militia that makes up the 19th PMF Brigade attacked an American base in Jordan with drones. Three American soldiers died.

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In 2023, Kata'ib Hezbollah kidnapped Elizabeth Tsurkov, a Jewish student at Princeton, and did not release her for 903 days.

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According to a U.S. government think tank, at least 36 PMF brigades were involved in drone and missile attacks on American bases in 2026. In response, the Americans bombed the headquarters of the PMF’s 30th, 40th, and 52nd Brigades in Iraq.

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Abu Fadak, the PMF chief of staff mentioned earlier, is also a member of Kata'ib Hezbollah. The U.S. has designated him a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.” This past August, media reports indicated that the prime minister wanted to remove him from his post. Yet to this day, he remains in command.

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So even if militias like Kata’ib Hezbollah were to place themselves entirely under the authority of the PMF—and thus, formally, under the government—Iran would likely continue to exert influence over them. Not much would change. The seemingly paradoxical situation—in which the PMF is nominally subordinate to the government but nevertheless acts independently—becomes clear when one takes a closer look at the Iraqi government.

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After all, it’s hard to compare the Iraqi government to governments like those in Germany and the U.S. There is no central state authority that exercises power. Researchers like Renad Mansour argue that the PMF and the Iraqi state should instead be viewed as a network—with thousands of individual actors exercising power. Some of whom are linked by shared interests—such as religion, clan structures, the pursuit of profit, or ideology. Individual actors within this network hold more power and influence than others: the prime minister, the largest political parties, the U.S., and Iran. But whether power shifts within this network from Iran to the prime minister—or vice versa—probably makes little difference to most Iraqis. Armed fighters will continue to stop citizens at checkpoints and demand bribes. Militias like Kata’ib Hezbollah will not abandon their radical Shi’ite ideology, in which resistance against America and Israel and the words of the mullahs are the highest commandments. And militiamen will likely continue to attack Americans and their allies—whether the prime minister wants it or not.

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However: Even if power in Iraq shifts just a little toward the prime minister—and even if that makes little difference for now—it would be a small step toward a little more order in Iraq. Further steps could follow. After many years of turmoil and civil war that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein—a period during which hundreds of factions took root in the power vacuum left behind by the dictator—most Iraqis would likely welcome the militias’ submission to the prime minister.