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A recent article in the Financial Times floated the idea of a "Helsinki Process for the Middle East." It is an idea that gives one pause for thought.

But first, a look back: The Helsinki process grew out of the unresolved status of Germany after WWII. This had twice nearly spilled over into war during the Berlin crises of 1948/49 and 1958/61. At the same time the USA was becoming more involved with Asia, in the Vietnam War, and in the Soviet Union, the bullish confidence of Kruschev was replaced with a leadership more acutely aware of the system’s long-term vulnerabilities, especially economic. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, they had also lost a lot of credibility with left-wing parties in western Europe and rifts were opening also with China.

The Soviet Union was thus looking for a way to stabilise its position in Eastern Europe and proposed a European Security Conference to discuss this, not including the United States. This was opposed by the US and western powers, but in any case, a more immediate problem was who should represent Germany. The USSR was adamant that East Germany was now an independent sovereign country, while the western powers insisted that Germany should be a single country.  

Status of the FRG and GDR: Kekkonen Breaks the Impasse

Finnish President Urho Kekkonen broke the impasse by proposing to start negotiations while leaving this question open. This allowed the start of many years of negotiation, concentrating on what could be agreed on rather than focus only on what could not be agreed, leading eventually to a “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” (CSCE) and Helsinki “Final Act” signed by both East and West Germany even though neither agreed on the status to be accorded to the other.

Diplomacy with the three "baskets"

Widely differing views on security, economic and human rights issues were accommodated in the CSCE by separating these issues into three separate “baskets” so that discussions in one area did not obstruct too much progress being made in others.

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A key plank of the “security” basket was agreement to “Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). These had a focus on preventing a nuclear war escalating from a misunderstanding or misreading of moves made by one side or the other.

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In the particular context of the Cold War, these started with formal notification of major military exercises and the rights of other states to observe them.

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Parallels between the Helsinki Process and the Middle East

The current situation in the Gulf is very different to that in Europe in the early 1970s, however the Helsinki Process does offer some parallels, not least that it is possible to make progress without trying first to solve difficult problems of legal recognition.

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In the short term, Iran sees itself as having won a strategic victory because the regime has stayed in place and this can sustain it as long as there is an immediate military threat, but at some point the regime in Iran will need to respond to the needs of its population. On top of everything else the country faces a severe water crisis, which is currently being masked by the short-term military emergency.

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A New Variant of Khomeinism in Iran

The regime that is emerging from the smoke of assassination strikes is based around a hard core of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, many of them veterans of the eight year “imposed war”, when Iraq launched ballistic missiles at Iranian cities. The regime remains notionally Islamic, but it is increasingly absurd to call it a “theocracy”. Ali Khamenei’s credentials as a “Grand Ayatollah” were always shaky, his son’s even more so. We now have a Stalinist variation on Khomeinism, in which the only real ideology is the regime’s own self-interest. But this very withdrawal into national self interest might implicitly reduce tensions elsewhere. While support for Hezbollah remains a key Iranian negotiating demand it is noticeable that Hamas is no longer mentioned.

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Iran is back to being the regional power that it was under the Shah, who supported Kurdish rebels against the then Government of Iraq and sent troops to Oman to fight rebels supported from Yemen. The Shah was also the father of the Iranian nuclear programme, willing to sign the NPT so long as this did not set him at a disadvantage to his neighbours.

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Hardliners Oppose Concessions to the US

The regime is now confident that regime change is only possible through invasion and military occupation and that this is not going to happen. Also that, as the US and Israel will not be satisfied with anything short of regime change, any deals will be in the form of short-term ceasefires; a sustainable peace is not achievable. The hard liners will point to the collapse of the JCPOA and the June 2025 attacks of last year as proof that concessions to the US get Iran nowhere.

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They have achieved their current leverage by brutality, both internal and external. Any stable ceasefire seems likely to turn into a “cold war” between Iran and its southern neighbours. Is there a way out of this?

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Iran’s southern neighbours need to find a way to assure their security in a situation in which simply relying on US protection has been shown to be insufficient. The Iranian regime is deeply mistrustful. However, it does have a mutual interest with its neighbours in regional stability and in issues like freedom of navigation, putting certain infrastructure “off limits” for military action and perhaps even mutual observation of military infrastructure.

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Meetings without preconditions

These interests and a common NPT obligation to submit all nuclear material to international monitoring could become a shared source of confidence.

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A meeting without preconditions, like that at Dipoli, could look at the development of CBMs, whose patient and reliable enforcement would start to create a basis of trust, which could be expanded over time into a more solid regional security structure. [A complicating factor is that tensions which were already growing between the UAE and Saudi Arabia have spread into policy towards Iran: the UAE has moved from “armed neutrality” to directly attacking Iran. This in turn seems to be exposing tensions within the UAE where rulers closer to Iran (such as the Emir of Sharjah, who shares with Iran the Island of Abu Musa) are apparently unhappy with the direction being taken by Abu Dhabi. However neither of the two sides in the Helsinki negotiations were entirely united, following de Gaulle’s withdrawal of France from the military structures of NATO and the often independent line taken by President Ceacescu in Romania (and later by the Hungarians). ]

About the author: 

Timothy Marschall Jones was a career diplomat for the United Kingdom for forty years, serving as ambassador to Tajikistan and Armenia, among other roles. His first posting in the UK diplomatic service was in 1987 with the British delegation to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna.

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