The unprecedented influx of migrants from Morocco to Ceuta at the end of July tested the ability of member states to implement effective, joint, and coordinated measures to manage migration emergencies. Between July 30 and 31, 2026, between 50,000 and 60,000 people—some sources estimate as many as 70,000—swam several hundred meters along the border of the Spanish enclave and climbed over the fences to reach Ceuta from Morocco. According to recent reports, at least 80 people have died, and many are still missing. The death toll could rise further.

This incident has sparked a fierce debate across Europe. While there have been previous attempts at mass crossings from Morocco into the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, never before have such large-scale inflows been recorded within such a short period of time.

This has cast doubt on whether these were spontaneous movements. It is highly unlikely that 60,000 to 70,000 people, including women and children, would suddenly decide to swim to Ceuta together without taking even the most basic supplies to ensure their survival. In fact, investigations by the relevant authorities and statements from Moroccan citizens who arrived in Ceuta paint a clear picture.

Disinformation on social media

According to intelligence reports from Rabat, false information was spread on Moroccan social media claiming that the borders to the enclave—which are normally closed and heavily guarded—had been opened and that migrants could reach Ceuta without difficulty and subsequently receive permission to travel on to Spain.

The migrants themselves confirmed this during interviews after their arrival in Ceuta. Spanish media reported collusive behavior by Moroccan security forces, who are accused of facilitating or even encouraging the flow of migrants toward the border. Furthermore, according to the Spanish newspaper "El Español," surveillance videos recorded by the Guardia Civil allegedly show Moroccan intelligence agents in plain clothes among the groups of migrants. Investigators believe some of these agents were performing coordination and monitoring tasks while Moroccan nationals entered Ceuta.

Parallels with Belarus 2021

If confirmed, this would not have been a spontaneous attempt at mass migration, but rather an act of "hybrid warfare" by Morocco against Madrid. In this scenario, the migration flows would have been directed by external forces to exert pressure on Spanish authorities and their reception infrastructure.

A similar case occurred during the crisis between Belarus and the European Union in the summer of 2021: at that time, the Belarusian government incited a sharp increase in the influx of migrants from countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, Belarus, and Iran toward EU borders (particularly the borders with Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland).

According to some sources, the goal was to pressure Brussels into recognizing the legitimacy of the disputed re-election of Prime Minister Alexander Lukashenko. Lukashenko is considered a close ally of Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, the intention was to have the sanctions imposed on Minsk lifted.

Punishment over the Western Sahara issue…

Morocco may have pursued the same strategy in Ceuta to punish Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and his government over the contentious Western Sahara issue. Western Sahara is a former Spanish colony that Rabat considers an integral part of its own territory. On July 20, 2026, Sánchez traveled to Algiers to revive relations with Algeria, Morocco's main regional rival and a long-standing supporter of the Polisario Front. Since 1973, this political and military movement has demanded independence for Western Sahara, first from Spanish colonial rule and subsequently from military occupation by Morocco and Mauritania.

Three days after the visit, the Justice Committee of the Spanish Congress passed a bill granting Spanish citizenship to Sahrawis who originated from Western Sahara and were born during the Spanish colonial administration, as well as their descendants. This measure immediately triggered protests in Rabat, as it openly challenges Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

…or the stance on the Palestine issue?

However, other analysts speculate that the masterminds behind this operation could be supported by the United States or Israel. The governments of these countries maintain excellent relations with King Mohammed VI of Morocco. In Washington's case, any potential interference could be linked to the fact that Sánchez did not comply with President Trump's demand to increase Spanish military spending for NATO and to make military bases in Andalusia available for operations in Iran. Tel Aviv, on the other hand, might want to retaliate against one of the European governments that has most strongly supported Palestine and has been the most vocal critic of the actions taken by Benjamin Netanyahu's government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank over the last three years.

Not genuine asylum seekers

In any case, Spain's problem was not the influx of migrants. The vast majority of those who entered Ceuta returned to Morocco within 48 hours. This confirmed that they were not genuine asylum seekers. Given how difficult it usually is to pass security checks, it is highly unlikely that anyone seeking international protection would leave the exclave so quickly and without resistance.

For Sánchez, the real problem lay in the reaction of certain European countries, particularly Italy. Prime Minister Meloni immediately blamed the Spanish government for the influx from Morocco and announced a one-month suspension of the Schengen Agreement for third-country nationals arriving in Italian ports and airports from Spain. The official justification was to "prevent potential impacts on our nation," as "uncontrolled illegal immigration poses a real threat to the security of European borders."

Stricter controls between Spain and Italy

As a result of the suspension of the Schengen Agreement, border controls have been reintroduced for people entering Italy from Spain. At Italian airports and ports, passengers from Spain must undergo standard police checks and present a valid ID card or passport instead of using the "fast-track" lanes. Non-EU citizens, who are the target of the measure, must prove the legality of their stay or visa.

As expected, the Spanish government has vehemently protested against Italy's decision, pointing out that arrival in Ceuta does not grant free access to the Spanish mainland. People staying in the exclave require a special permit from the Spanish authorities and are subject to strict checks before being allowed to depart by air or sea.

Furthermore, although Ceuta is formally part of Spain, it is explicitly excluded from the Schengen Area. It is therefore unclear what logic the Italian government followed when it suspended the rules for freedom of movement in an area to which the territory affected by the influx of migrants does not even belong.

Domestic political motives in Italy

Another aspect of the Meloni government's suspension of the Schengen Area that is difficult to understand is that it only applies to ports and airports, but not to checks at land borders. In other words, someone who has entered Spanish territory illegally could still easily travel through Spain and France by land and enter Italy via the Italian-French border without being subjected to any checks.

There are compelling reasons to suspect that the suspension of the Schengen Agreement between Italy and Spain is more closely linked to Italy's current domestic political situation than to the fight against illegal migration flows. Parliamentary elections are set to take place in Italy in 2027, and the handling of migrants will be a central campaign issue. The campaign is already in full swing. Several right-wing parties—including the new party "Futuro Nazionale," founded by General Roberto Vannacci—are promising to implement even stricter measures against asylum seekers than those introduced by the Meloni government.

Polls consistently show that "Futuro Nazionale" is drawing votes away from other right-wing parties, particularly the Lega and Fratelli d'Italia. It therefore seems plausible that Meloni wanted to avoid being accused of negligence by taking early restrictive measures against Madrid and blaming Sánchez for the crisis, in order to prevent further loss of support.

Furthermore, Meloni has repeatedly expressed her support for Vox, the radical, far-right Spanish party led by Santiago Abascal. Like Meloni, Abascal has blamed the Spanish socialist Prime Minister for the Ceuta affair.

Three Lessons for the EU

In summary, the European Union can draw at least three lessons from the Ceuta affair, none of which bode well for European interests.

• Lesson No. 1: In times of crisis, the actions of member state governments are influenced far more by domestic political issues and ideological affinities than by a desire to define common European intervention strategies. While this may offer short-term electoral advantages, it jeopardizes the stability of European solidarity during crises. This solidarity has often been invoked in the past, for example by Italian governments when Rome was under pressure from the large number of migrants arriving on Lampedusa. Responding to the migration emergencies of other countries primarily by closing one's own internal borders is unlikely to encourage other member states to offer help should one become the victim of similar mass influxes of asylum seekers in the future.

• Lesson No. 2: Ceuta is the latest example of how migration flows can be used by public or private actors as tools of hybrid warfare to influence the actions of member states. A system for managing migration flows that relies unconditionally on the governments of third countries to control the departure of migrants to Europe may be effective as long as relations with those governments are peaceful. However, it can easily become a powerful weapon for blackmail when political, economic, or strategic conflicts of interest arise. The security of the Union's external borders must not depend on such unreliable and short-lived agreements.

• Lesson No. 3: One of the remedies proposed during the Ceuta crisis was to accelerate the construction of return centers in third countries. These states would be prepared to take over the processing of asylum applications and the return of migrants who are not eligible for asylum and are on their way to Europe. Unlike the centers established by Italy in Albania, which are fully under Italian jurisdiction but remain inactive due to unresolved legal issues, these return centers would be managed by the local authorities of the host third country. Regarding the control of migrant departures to Europe, the same objection applies: transferring the management of the centers to the governments of third countries would give them a powerful weapon with which to blackmail the EU—a "ticking time bomb" that could explode at any moment, perhaps in the middle of an election campaign.

Meanwhile, at the meeting of the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council on August 4, the interior ministers of the 27 member states jointly expressed their "strong solidarity" with Spain, as well as their appreciation for the "speed and effectiveness of the Spanish authorities' response in managing the situation in Ceuta."

The first stress test for the new EU Pact

In fact, Ceuta was the first stress test for the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which only came into force a few weeks ago. The Pact was intended to institutionalize a binding yet flexible solidarity mechanism to support first-entry countries facing significant migration pressure. However, given the discrepancies between the official position of the EU and the stance of individual national governments, which have shown far less solidarity than required, it is clear that the Pact has been anything but successful in this test.

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The author is Scientific Director of the Centro Politiche Europee, Rome. The CEP is a think tank for democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy. This analysis was first published by the CEP.

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