“We Won’t Take Any of Them”: The Shock for GDR Diplomats After November 9, 1989
Column by Ewald König
Today, November 9, marks the 37th anniversary of the historic press conference held by Politburo member Günter Schabowski ( “…immediately, without delay”) and the fall of the Berlin Wall, and when I cross the strip of cobblestones on my way to the office—which marks the former course of the Wall—questions still arise that I have as a foreign observer of this country and as a historical witness to those times. On this anniversary, I’d like to raise just one of them, because hardly anyone else does.
I have a controversial theory that I know not everyone shares. But I still believe it was a mistake to dismiss all GDR diplomats en masse without individual review.
“We won’t take any of them,” Hans-Dietrich Genscher is quoted as saying. The then-foreign minister ignored the diplomats’ requests to discuss personnel issues with them, as the parties directly affected. They weren’t even consulted.
I find it interesting that the Bundeswehr managed surprisingly well to integrate military personnel from the National People’s Army of the GDR. Why shouldn’t it have worked in the diplomatic service as well?
The public considered the handling of the diplomats’ situation hardly worth discussing. In private conversations—but never publicly—the GDR diplomats did hear from their West German colleagues that they regretted the measure.
I believe that the Foreign Office not only treated many diplomats unfairly on a personal level, but also threw away a great treasure trove of knowledge and contacts.
As an example, I’ll cite an episode involving Willy Brandt that leaves a bitter aftertaste. In the summer of 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Saddam Hussein wanted to keep the Germans there as human shields or hostages. East German Ambassador Kurt Merkel rendered such outstanding service in rescuing West German citizens in invaded Kuwait that it was absolutely clear to Brandt that Merkel would be incorporated into the diplomatic service after reunification. Brandt lobbied Genscher on Merkel’s behalf. State Secretary Franz Bertele also summoned Ambassador Merkel and told him he didn’t even need to apply—it went without saying that he would be accepted.
But things turned out differently. “We’re not taking any of them.” No one dared to oppose Genscher’s decision. It is rumored that he had reservations—after all, one never knew who one was bringing into the fold with these GDR diplomats. Without comment, Kurt Merkel received his documents back with the terse note: “For our records.”
Kurt Merkel was not the only one. Toward the end of the GDR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MfAA) in East Berlin employed 3,122 staff members both at home and abroad. Of these, 1,446 were in the diplomatic service, 667 at headquarters, and 779 at diplomatic missions abroad. 88.7 percent held a college degree; three-quarters spoke official UN languages; and many were fluent in rare national or regional languages. At that time, the GDR maintained 89 embassies and numerous consulates general around the globe.
In the summer of 1990, approximately 300 diplomats returned to East Berlin from the embassies. When they were handed the paperwork for their dismissal, it became clear to them that from the very beginning, there had been no consideration whatsoever of integrating them into the unified German diplomatic service, because “with your degree, you do not meet the educational requirements for admission to the preparatory service for a career in the higher foreign service.”
Genscher’s arguments for the rejection thus went back to the years of training that GDR diplomats had undergone at the Moscow Institute of International Relations—yet, on the other hand, this university seemed good enough to him to accept an honorary doctorate from.
In this way, Germany cut itself off from valuable sources of information. Only behind the scenes did some members of parliament and politicians know how to make use of the “retired GDR diplomats” as valuable sources in their discussions.
I agree with Egon Bahr, who believed that Germany’s reunification could have been better accepted internationally if the GDR diplomats had not been marginalized. I’ll go even further and say that, with the expertise and network of the GDR diplomats, the Federal Republic would have a different relationship with Russia today. They knew how Moscow worked. They were experienced in negotiating with Russians. Perhaps even the current war could have been avoided.
Take Bulgaria as an example: Bulgaria’s accession to NATO (2004) and the EU (2007) succeeded largely thanks to experienced diplomats trained in the Soviet Union, who were able to contribute crucial institutional expertise for Euro-Atlantic integration.
Germany could have made use of these people and their knowledge and networks. Not necessarily as ambassadors—since that would not have been readily accepted by their West German colleagues—but in an advisory capacity on many international matters. East German diplomacy had certain strengths, often linked to economic ties. This applied above all to the Eastern Bloc, Africa, and the Arab world.
What the civil service dismissed was welcomed by the German business community. Companies knew how to leverage diplomatic expertise, international experience, knowledge of foreign countries and languages, and—above all—the diplomats’ personal contacts.
A comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries that underwent their own political transformations in 1989–90 also seems legitimate to me. Unlike the GDR, they did not have a “big brother” that could have brought them something like an “Eastern Economic Boom,” “flourishing landscapes,” and the Solidarity Surcharge. Unlike the East Germans, they had to cope with the consequences of the political transformation on their own. They were able to decide for themselves how to deal with their former diplomats. Compared to their colleagues from the former Eastern Bloc, GDR diplomats were at a disadvantage.
Another brief look back: It is well known that in the 1950s, many civil servants had more than just a “brown stain” on their records. They had quickly adapted to the Nazi regime and were nevertheless allowed to continue in their positions afterward. Their expertise was considered more important than their political past. At the time, the subtle euphemism was that they were “only useful in Arab countries.” Was it permissible to deny GDR civil servants the chance for a fresh start, just as West Germans themselves had so casually done after 1945?
