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Péter Magyar’s (TISZA) election victory will not only change Hungary’s European policy, but also give the media cause for hope. Since Viktor Orbán’s election victory in 2010, the Hungarian media landscape has undergone a fundamental transformation within just a few years. In a highly concentrated media market, critical journalism came under pressure; nevertheless, new independent projects emerged, founded by former journalists from established media outlets.

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Ákos Tóth, the former editor-in-chief of Népszabadság—one of the largest and most important newspapers, which was shut down by Orbán—and Hungarian media scholar Gábor Polyák were guests at korrespondenten.cafe in Berlin. Just before the Hungarian election Sunday, they presented the book “After the Conquest – How Autocrats Control the Media” together with publisher Andrea von Finckenstein and Eastern Europe expert Joachim Weidemann.  

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How political power is changing the public sphere

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The evolution of Hungary’s media landscape since 2010 serves as a prime example of how quickly democratic structures can change. At the center of this are Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his party, Fidesz, whose political strategy has profoundly reshaped the country’s media landscape.

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To understand the political upheaval, it is worth taking a look back. In the mid-2000s, the government of the time lost a great deal of credibility. A turning point was the admission by then-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004–2009) that he had deliberately deceived the public during the election campaign. This revelation led to a deep social divide.

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The result was a political vacuum. The government had squandered nearly all trust. Although the transitional government under Gordon Bajnai stabilized the economy in the short term, the country remained politically shaken.

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In this environment, Viktor Orbán secured a landslide election victory in 2010 with a two-thirds majority. This majority not only allows for simple legislative changes but also for far-reaching interventions in the constitution and state institutions. Orbán consistently leveraged this majority. At the same time, key positions within the state apparatus were filled with loyalists.

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Media as a key instrument of power

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Early on, the government focused on the media and adopted a two-pronged strategy. Orbán built up a media system aligned with his political views, comprising television stations, radio stations, and newspapers. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, many Western media companies withdrew from Central and Eastern Europe, including major players such as Axel Springer, Deutsche Telekom, and RTL Group. This development opened up new opportunities for him. Entrepreneurs with ties to the government bought up numerous media outlets.

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At the same time, new media laws altered the institutional framework and opened the floodgates to state influence. The once pluralistic media landscape was fundamentally transformed within a few years.

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Despite these interventions, there is no complete censorship in Hungary in the traditional sense. There are still independent voices, particularly in online media and social networks, that offer alternative sources of information. Critical voices, however, face economic and political pressure. It is precisely these independent voices that have helped challenge the political balance of power through investigative reporting and well-founded analysis. They uncovered serious misconduct.

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Notably, this involved a system that would be almost unimaginable in Western Europe: private media companies were financed to a significant extent by government funds. Public funds—for example, in the form of government advertisements or other resources—flowed into these media outlets on a large scale.

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By the 2020s at the latest, it also became clear what a central role social networks play in political communication. Platforms like Facebook and YouTube were specifically used to spread political messages. Here, too, public funds flowed into online advertising featuring pro-government content.

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The takeover of the media structure

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A particularly striking example of the structural transformation of the media is the establishment of the Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány, the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA). Within a very short time, numerous regional newspapers and media companies were transferred to this foundation—through seemingly voluntary donations by their owners, who were often merely front men.

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In other European countries, this would have triggered antitrust investigations. Not in Hungary. The process was declared part of a “national strategy” and thus deliberately removed from the scrutiny of competition authorities.

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This raises fundamental questions about ownership structures: Why are business owners relinquishing their media holdings—without any apparent compensation? The players had previously benefited from government contracts and subsidies. But what the state grants, it can also take away. Thus, Orbán’s former close confidants lost influence and wealth within a very short time.

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Another pattern emerges in the acquisition of regional media: business owners purchased newspapers using loans from banks under government influence. After these media outlets were transferred to foundations affiliated with the government, the corresponding debts disappeared from the books. In this way, extensive control over large parts of the media market was established.

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Today, around 80 percent of the Hungarian media market—measured by advertising and circulation volume—is directly or indirectly under the influence of the government.

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The case of Népszabadság

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The case of the long-established daily newspaper Népszabadság illustrates the concrete impact of these developments. Once the country’s highest-circulation newspaper, it had evolved after the fall of communism into a respected, independent newspaper with an international network of correspondents.

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But with changing owners and growing political pressure, conflicts intensified. The editorial staff found itself in confrontation with the government. A symbolic moment was Orbán’s visit to the newsroom in 2009. As it was already becoming apparent that he might return to power, he wanted to meet with the newspaper’s executives in person, only to subsequently fire them and later have the newspaper shut down.

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At the time of its closure, the newspaper was by no means financially bankrupt, as is often claimed. It was profitable, paid its employees good salaries, and had a stable subscriber base.

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The Origo case

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Another key example is the news portal Origo, once one of Hungary’s most important online media outlets. Founded in the late 1990s, it quickly developed into a platform for young, investigative journalists.

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Origo was operated by Magyar Telekom, the Hungarian subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom. But a fundamental conflict of interest emerged here: on the one hand, a critical media outlet; on the other, economic dependencies on government decisions—such as in the allocation of frequencies or infrastructure projects.

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Revelations about a government official’s expenses led to an open conflict with politicians. As a result, the editorial team was restructured, and critical journalists left the portal or were fired. Some later founded new investigative platforms and continued their work. Origo changed hands and came under pro-government influence.

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Media concentration: The role of KESMA

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This trend reached its peak in 2018 with the creation of KESMA, an unprecedented media conglomerate. Within a very short time, some 476 media companies were “merged” into this foundation—with antitrust reviews suspended. The consequences of this massive concentration of media power: advertising revenue flows mainly to pro-government media; editorial offices are increasingly under political influence; critical voices are losing their economic foundation.

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Role of foreign investors and the EU

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The role of international companies is often overlooked. Foreign investors withdrew from the media market or sold their holdings — partly for economic reasons, partly due to political pressure. This created a vacuum that was deliberately filled by investors with ties to the government, often acting as front men.

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The European Union’s hesitant response also contributed to this. Although complaints were filed regarding violations of state aid and competition law, concrete measures failed to materialize; some proceedings were dropped, while others are still ongoing. This reveals the structural weaknesses of European mechanisms in addressing democratic backsliding.

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With the European Media Freedom Act, the EU intended to create a powerful tool for protecting independent media. In practice, however, a fundamental problem has emerged: Formally, it is an EU regulation that must be implemented directly in all member states. Yet it contains numerous gaps that must be filled by national legislators. This gives governments leeway to act as they see fit—especially in Hungary: Despite clear guidelines, such as those regarding the use of public funds in the advertising market, state resources continue to be specifically used to support pro-government media.

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Although the European Commission launched proceedings against Hungary in January, the sanction mechanisms have been far too slow. Tying EU funding to conditions did have an effect. Billions of euros were frozen because Hungary failed to comply with the rule of law. But Orbán responded with a counterstrategy. He tied his approval of EU policy toward Russia or aid to Ukraine to the release of these funds.

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Populist communication strategies

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The power structure in Hungary stems from a sophisticated political communication strategy, largely shaped by American spin doctors Arthur Finkelstein and George Birnbaum. The principle: politics requires clear bogeymen. These are deliberately constructed, emotionally charged, and personally defamed. In Hungary, these have repeatedly been foreign investors, the philanthropist George Soros, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as a synonym for Brussels and the EU, and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

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This strategy is working. Pro-government media spread these messages via television, radio, print, and social media, supplemented by massive billboard campaigns across the country.

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Meanwhile, Orbán reinterprets the EU’s tools against disinformation—namely, swift interventions on platforms like TikTok or Facebook—portraying them as censorship.

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Despite extremely difficult conditions, independent newsrooms continue to exist in Hungary, exposing abuses, highlighting contradictions, and contributing to the formation of public opinion. Their work has had an impact, particularly in the run-up to the recent election, which determined the country’s fundamental direction. Now, things are likely to change.
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