Interview by Gudrun Dometeit

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Mr. Nikel, you spent over 40 years in diplomatic service and have extensively reflected on your personal experiences in a book that has just been published. In it, you write that you have never experienced so many serious conflicts at the same time as you are now. Is German foreign policy well-positioned enough to cope with these challenges?

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It’s true that there are not only major military conflicts in Ukraine, the Persian Gulf, or Sudan, but also many other non-military disputes, such as those with China. At the same time, we must address the vulnerabilities arising from changes in U.S. global strategy. The traffic-light coalition government and now the black-red federal government have taken important steps by increasing military spending. But much is still moving too slowly and lacks clear focus. There is still room for improvement.

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Now, a conflict has been raging for a long time in our immediate neighborhood—in Ukraine—that is being negotiated exclusively between Russia and the U.S. What have we done so fundamentally wrong that neither German nor European politics or diplomacy can influence it?

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Due to our policies over recent years, if not decades, we are unable to bring enough weight to the table, especially in terms of economic and military strength, for Russia to view us as an equal negotiating partner.  

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You write that without a strategy, even the best diplomacy is of no use. Why is it that Germany, in particular, has such a hard time developing strategies for its foreign policy? A China strategy was introduced relatively late, and, of all things, there is still no new Russia strategy.

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It's not as if Germany acted without a strategy towards Russia. For years, we had a strategy that later proved to be a mistake. The original approach, which aimed for a Euro-Atlantic security order including Russia, was not wrong. On the contrary, it helped bring the Cold War to an end, enabled us to achieve German reunification, and allowed us, for example, to resolve conflicts in the Balkans with Russian support. Arms control policy, too, would not have worked if we had not tried to involve Russia. The problem: We failed to recognize in time that a position was gaining ground in Moscow that relied more on repression domestically and became increasingly aggressive in foreign policy. Examples of this include the wars in Chechnya up to 2009 and in Georgia in 2008, the occupation of Crimea in 2014, and then, of course, the full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022. We acted carelessly in terms of security policy and placed ourselves in a position of energy dependence that, in hindsight, can only be described as difficult to understand. That was one of the biggest mistakes in German foreign policy since the end of World War II.

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Are you suggesting there was too much appeasement towards Russia?

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I don't like the word "appeasement" at all, because diplomacy is not appeasement. Diplomacy is self-assertion – using the means available to the state. Economic and military strength, as well as a willingness to engage in dialogue, must come together. The term refers to the period before the 1938 Munich Agreement (in which France and Great Britain agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia to avoid war with Germany, ed.). Now some say we are in such a period again. Diplomacy must not be appeasement. If it is, it leads nowhere.

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If policy toward Russia was so flawed, where were the diplomatic early-warning systems? You held positions of responsibility at the Foreign Office and the Chancellery at the time. Did you yourself warn against becoming dependent on Russia or call for a different policy?

 
We all allowed ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security, and I include myself in that. You can't attribute this to any single person or any specific federal government. There was a broad consensus in German society—among governments, the business community, and the media—that it was both possible and desirable to establish a European order with Russia. To a certain extent, that did work; we just missed the point where it stopped working.

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Today, however, everything is often lumped together – conflicts in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine.

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I object to that as well. Chechnya was and is part of Russia. At the time, we criticized the disproportionately violent response and the serious human rights violations. That is different from the prohibition on the use of force in international relations. During Russia’s conflict with Georgia in 2008, we ultimately settled for the argument that the then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili had initiated the bombing—even though there had been prior provocations by Russia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After the first attacks on Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, we still maintained the construct of a security order with Russia. At that point, at the latest, we should have made a massive course correction. Instead, with the German government’s approval, BASF awarded another gas storage contract to Russia. In my view, President Vladimir Putin began to tighten his domestic and foreign policy course upon his return to the Kremlin in 2012.

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At the time, Saakashvili was banking on NATO membership and thought it would be facilitated by a provoked Russian attack. Today, people sometimes speak of “so-called” Russian security interests. Isn’t it legitimate for Russia to have been concerned in light of discussions about further NATO expansion to the east, especially given its history of being invaded on numerous occasions? When the issue of Ukraine’s NATO accession came up at the 2008 NATO summit, Angela Merkel warned that this was a red line for Russia.

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I don't find the term "expansion" entirely appropriate in this context. Expansion would imply that the initiative came from NATO, but in fact, it was the other way around. The countries themselves wanted to join. And in the 1990 CSCE Charter for a New Europe, Russia agreed that any country could join the alliance if it wished. A poor compromise was then reached at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Georgia and Ukraine were denied the so-called Membership Action Plan, but on the other hand, accession without a date was held out as a prospect. Since then, it was clear to everyone that Ukraine would not join NATO in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, Russia attacked it 6 and 14 years later. The attempt to justify Russian policy purely with security interests falls short. What is at stake here are tendencies that serve the imperial control of the region. We oppose this. It is important to continue our efforts to strengthen our capabilities, underpinned by dialogue. But that only works if we can project sufficient military and economic strength. Diplomacy means a fundamental willingness to speak with everyone, even the worst war criminals or enemies. I recall Willy Brandt, who traveled to Saddam Hussein in 1990 to secure the release of Western hostages. But the timing for dialogue is extremely important.

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Now is clearly not the right time. But how do we define the right time? Moreover, some politicians seem to reject any future contact with Russia on principle.

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Russia refuses to talk to Europe. So at the moment, I don’t think it makes much sense to pursue this dialogue. But we must fundamentally discuss the future of European security with Moscow. This includes—as in the second half of the Cold War—establishing strategic stability by trying to slow down escalation dynamics or getting back on track with arms control policy. This has nothing to do with appeasement and is, moreover, a long way off. But in the long run, we cannot simply put up a fence around this vast country and pretend it isn’t there.

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But waiting until we've achieved military strength sufficient for Russia to take us seriously could potentially take a very long time, couldn't it?

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That could indeed take some time. We need patience. But as I said, this isn't just about security. I fully understand that Russian security is always defined territorially. The further Russia's border is from its center, the safer Moscow feels. I won't dispute that. However, the methods used to exert imperial control over the former Soviet Union are unacceptable; they violate the international order’s prohibition on the use of force. Russia has violated this in the most egregious way, and Europe had to respond accordingly.

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Security expert Carlo Masala recently warned that Russia could attack a NATO country before 2029. And in your book, you yourself develop a scenario in which Russian troops advance into the Baltics via the so-called Suwalki Gap, potentially leading to a nuclear exchange. However, if there's a risk of dangerous military escalation, shouldn't diplomacy seize every opportunity to engage in dialogue now, rather than only in the medium or long term?

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During the Cold War, the policy of NATO and the West was based on deterrence and containment. And it was ultimately successful. In the first phase, it led, among other things, to the Cuban Missile Crisis. But in the second phase, dialogue within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as well as disarmament and arms control efforts, were added to the mix. The willingness to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles equipped with nuclear warheads in Western Europe as part of NATO’s 1982 rearmament was linked to a disarmament offer to the Soviet Union. It worked; the treaty on the elimination of an entire category of weapons was concluded. And we must now once again create the conditions for similar developments. To do so, we need dialogue, but not for dialogue’s sake. At the moment, the odds of that happening aren’t particularly good.

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What do you say to critics of Germany’s policy toward Russia who ask what the difference actually is between the U.S. intervention in Iraq—which was justified by a lie, cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and strengthened the Islamic State—and Russia’s attack on Ukraine? The Europeans, who hold international law in such high regard, took virtually no action at the time.

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Stop, stop. Former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder took a major transatlantic risk by opposing that war. The projection of military power alone does not lead to peace. You can see that today with Iran. In Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the battle was won at the beginning, but the war was lost in the end. In one case, it led to the strengthening of ISIS; in the other, to a withdrawal under extremely poor conditions, during which the Americans left us out in the cold. I am far from applying double standards. You could also accuse NATO of this regarding the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (which began without a UN mandate, ed.). But unlike the Russian attacks on Ukraine, it did not serve to annex foreign territory.  It is part of Russian propaganda to compare things that cannot be compared.

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You yourself lament Europe's lack of influence on current conflicts. How can Europeans assert themselves against a highly erratic U.S. president and power-hungry autocrats like those in China and Russia? Is Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's proposal to unite as middle powers and push back realistic? After all, centralized states always have an advantage.

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Donald Trump does not represent all of America. There are still checks and balances in place that function more or less effectively, and who knows what will happen in the midterm elections this November. Moreover, the U.S. is still needed as Europe’s defender. In particular, the nuclear guarantee is currently almost unimaginable without them. That is why, on the one hand, we must try to keep the Americans on board, at least in the short and medium term. On the other hand, as former EU Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell once said, we must learn the language of power. We must become more assertive in order to stand our ground.

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Following the German chancellor’s allegedly outrageous remarks, U.S. President Trump promptly implemented the decision to withdraw 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany. As a diplomat—if you were still at the Foreign Office or the Chancellery—how would you handle this? Would you advise Friedrich Merz to keep his emotions in check in the future? Does diplomacy even work anymore with Trump and his emissaries?

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I don’t want to set myself up as a referee giving advice from the sidelines. We need dialogue with America, with Trump, and the Chancellor has truly tried to achieve that. In the case of Greenland, it was necessary to speak in clear terms, and that worked. How long an agreement lasts is another question entirely. We must develop our own potential. In the face of U.S. tariff hikes, Europe certainly has certain opportunities with its single market. So dialogue, building military and, above all, economic strength—that is the recipe for success that drives diplomacy. It likely works even better with the U.S. than with others.

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You mentioned the language of power. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen once promised a “geopolitical Commission.” Not much has come of that, as we can see from the current crises. Doesn’t Germany also lack the “power gene” needed to lead the EU?

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The European Union is a community of nation-states that have decided to transfer certain powers to European institutions. Decision-making processes are slow, not always effective, and do not always lead to fully satisfactory results, to put it mildly. Nevertheless, in my view, we need this organization more than ever, because Germany alone can hardly make a difference in this world. And whether the EU will ever truly become a major power in this new multipolar system that is currently taking shape is also the question. But we only have a chance within the EU. For Germany, as the most populous and economically strongest country in the EU, this means taking on a leadership role. Given our history, this can never be a role where we call the shots and everyone else follows. The leadership style must be cooperative.

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You were involved in the preparation of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) with Iran, which was concluded in 2015. You became familiar with Iran’s negotiating style and behavior. In light of the current developments in the Iran conflict, what advice would you give to diplomats and negotiators on how to deal with Iran? Do you get the impression that the Americans are really negotiating in good faith?

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Iran has a culture dating back thousands of years, and Iranians are extremely tough negotiators. We must not harbor any illusions that we can force this regime onto the defensive through military means. What was achieved with the JCPOA in 2015 is, in a sense, something we can only dream of today. Military intervention did not, after all, lead the Iranians to abandon their plans to acquire a bomb. On the contrary. We must expect that they are pushing ahead with them even more vigorously. The agreement was not perfect, because many issues—such as ballistic missiles or support for terrorist groups—were not addressed. But it was a highly reasonable agreement, achievable under the circumstances at the time. If Trump hadn’t withdrawn in 2018, we wouldn’t be where we are today. The U.S. withdrawal was a mistake. And even if military action against Iran were successful today: You can’t bomb the knowledge of how to build a bomb out of people’s minds.

In response to your question about how to negotiate: I have to admit that it sometimes turns my stomach to see how the lead negotiators on the U.S. side approach these talks. This applies not only to the talks with Iran, but also to those with Russia. Even Russian sources complain about the American representatives. They have little to no expertise in regional politics. When dealing with Russia, they even rely on Vladimir Putin’s interpreter. These are all “no-gos” for international negotiations. They are simply different from the real estate negotiations the two U.S. envoys have conducted so far. In those, you essentially negotiate the price and meet in the middle. But here, important national interests are at stake. The dynamics are entirely different.

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Against this backdrop, what do you expect from a ceasefire agreement in the case of Iran?

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Negotiations in the Iran conflict have just reached an impasse. In Ukraine, we have an ongoing conflict in which Putin refuses to agree to a long-term ceasefire because he believes he can resolve the issue militarily. There is no military solution for either Ukraine or Iran. Ultimately, there must be a political solution. And in my view, for Iran, that consists of a return to the JCPOA, possibly in a slightly modified form. Before that, the issue of opening the Strait of Hormuz must be resolved. We must support Ukraine in such a way that, in the event of a negotiated settlement, it can come to the negotiating table with sufficient strength and is not forced to sign a declaration of surrender.

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But it won’t work without compromise—on either side.

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For the Russians, negotiations are simply a continuation of the war by other means. It’s all about the principle of “Kto kogo?”—who will defeat whom? It’s about imposing one’s will on the opponent. In the end, of course, we will have to talk about the territorial structure. But Ukraine’s orientation toward the West must not be up for negotiation. And that, I believe, is the crux of the matter. I consider NATO membership unlikely. But the prospect of EU accession must remain a possibility. And Ukraine needs reliable security guarantees.

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What needs to change in German diplomacy in light of the new geopolitical realities? Do we need more top diplomats like Hans-Dietrich Genscher or Henry Kissinger, who could drive things forward through shuttle diplomacy and skill?

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We have very capable people. Overall, we need to draw the right conclusions from history, but we also need to have a vision for the future. This is very difficult because we are in a transitional phase, in a world that is becoming increasingly multipolar, with major powers that are no longer necessarily willing to cooperate as they have in the past, and in which a new order must be established. For example, will there be an American order in North and South America, and a Chinese one in Asia?

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You mean different spheres of influence?

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Spheres of order or spheres of influence, in which the respective hegemonic powers determine the course of events. Or will a new overarching system of rules emerge, as we had in the 19th century, for example, or total anarchy? That is also conceivable. I consider a pure continuation of the rule-based order—which we continue to advocate for, and rightly so—to be quite unlikely.

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The politicians we need for new ideas just happen not to be in office right now…

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There are many politicians with very good ideas. I also believe that this federal government isn’t doing all that much wrong at the moment. It’s just in a difficult situation, which stems not only from the many conflicts brought in from outside, but also from the fact that German society is becoming increasingly polarized. And the democratic center is shrinking. It is difficult to make policy in such an environment.

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Is the National Security Council, as it is currently staffed with representatives from the ministries, an adequate instrument for conducting strategic foresight?  

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I think it is assured that the expertise of think tanks will be incorporated there. But the Security Council has only just been established; at present, it has only an acting head. Still, the fact that this framework exists is a step forward. Now it must be put to use. Incidentally, Germany does not lack strategies; it lacks the implementation of strategies. I served for 14 years in the Federal Chancellery under three different chancellors, and it was not always easy to bring the various stakeholders together.

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Are the instruments of German foreign policy still up to date, or is there a need, for example, for more crisis prediction using modern tools, such as artificial intelligence?

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In the future, AI will likely play a more significant role in processing information from various sources. When it comes to taking action, however, I am skeptical as to whether AI—at least in its current stage—can truly be of assistance. Above all, we must be careful to avoid creating automated processes where, for example, AI assesses an attack and immediately triggers a counterattack. In the end, a human must always make the decision. I recall the many incidents during the Cold War where machines signaled supposed attacks. Take 1983, for example, when Soviet officer Stanislav Petrov—thank God—identified the alleged launch of U.S. nuclear missiles as a false alarm, thereby accidentally saving humanity from a nuclear war. That is why all alarm bells should be ringing if, under the impression that everything must happen quickly, we now leave such decisions to machines.

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In your book, you mention the Königsberg philosopher Immanuel Kant. What do you think of the following quote: “A standing army is a major obstacle to peace”?

 
Eighteenth-century philosophy is of very limited use when it comes to assessing today’s reality. I have a very high regard for his philosophy. But the eternal peace he writes about exists, if at all, only with God after death.

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So it's a utopia.

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Yes. To a certain extent, the European Union is based on the legal codification of mutual relations. That is Kantian thinking. However, Germany and Europe stand relatively alone in the world today in this regard. We must find ways and means to create peace today, but not through the absence of a standing army, rather through a sensible policy based on deterrence while simultaneously emphasizing a fundamental willingness to engage in dialogue.

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Rolf Nikel served as a diplomat at the embassies in Moscow, Nairobi, and Paris, among other posts; he headed the Department for Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, and the Balkans in the Federal Chancellery; and he served as the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control. From 2014 to 2020, he served as head of the embassy in Warsaw. He is Vice President of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

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