Column by Michael Backfisch

The overwhelming election victory of the right-wing populist AfD in Saxony-Anhalt is not just a regional earthquake in eastern Germany. Even though the Minister President in Magdeburg can directly shape policy only in a narrow range of areas—such as education, law enforcement, and the judiciary—opinion polls show that the AfD is also gaining momentum in other federal states. Nationwide, it currently ranks first with just under 30 percent of the vote. The anti-immigration, EU-skeptic, and nationalist group advocates leaving the eurozone and fostering good relations with Russia. Despite these core demands, it cannot be dismissed as a far-right phenomenon on the political spectrum. Based on its voter base, the AfD is a mainstream party. Similar trends are emerging in key EU countries such as France, Italy, Spain, and Poland, where a new president or a new parliament will be elected in 2027. Right-wing populists are gaining ground there as well. While their platforms are not identical to the AfD’s objectives—in some cases there are major differences—they are all united by the prioritization of national interests and their distancing from Brussels. The EU faces a stress test in the coming year.

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In France, Marine Le Pen, the parliamentary leader of the right-wing populist Rassemblement National (RN), has steered her party toward a course of “de-demonization” in recent years. Her motto has been to smooth out radical edges in order to become socially acceptable even among centrist voters. Specifically, the call for withdrawal from the EU and the abolition of the euro has been removed from the party platform. This move away from radicalism is part of Le Pen’s political strategy to win the presidential election in the spring of 2027. She currently leads in the polls.

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But this softer image is primarily an electoral ploy. Le Pen and party leader RN leader Jordan Bardella want to undermine the EU from within. They want the European Commission to return powers to the nation-states. Furthermore, the RN aims to significantly cut France’s financial contributions to the EU budget. National border controls are to be tightened, migration limited, and French citizens given preference in social benefits and employment.

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When it comes to relations with Russia, the RN remains vague. Under Le Pen's leadership, the party received a loan from a Moscow-aligned bank in 2014; in 2017, President Vladimir Putin received the RN leader in the Kremlin. After the Russian attack on Ukraine, this proximity became politically tricky. Since then, the RN has been trying to weaken its position in Russia without clearly separating itself from Moscow. The party opposes the EU’s 90-billion-euro loan to Ukraine.

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Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, with her centre-right coalition, has been in office longer than any other cabinet in the Italian Republic. The leader of the post-fascist party “Fratelli d'Italia” was considered the “most dangerous woman in Europe” before she was sworn in in October 2022. But it has abandoned radical demands from earlier times, such as an exit from the EU and the Eurozone. As a member of the E5 group, Italy stands alongside Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Poland in advocating for a strong defense and political and military support for Ukraine. Meloni aims to curb irregular immigration and increase the number of deportations.

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But the prime minister is facing increasing competition from the far right. Former General Roberto Vannacci, with his party “Futuro Nazionale” founded in February, wants to take an even tougher stance against migrants and is considered an ardent admirer of Putin. He advocates ending aid to Ukraine and purchasing cheap oil and gas from Russia. Just seven months after its launch, “Futuro Nazionale” stands at 7.5 percent in the polls—and the trend is upward. Meloni’s coalition partners, “Forza Italia” and “Lega,” trail behind. To prevail against the center-left coalition in the 2027 parliamentary election, the head of government may find herself forced to form an alliance with Vannacci. Meloni was already on the defensive during the refugee influx into the Spanish exclave of Ceuta at the end of July. She sharply criticized Madrid’s migration policy and rushed to demand that Spain be excluded from the Schengen Area. With Vannacci in the government, Italy would no longer be a stabilizing force in Europe.

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The refugee crisis in Ceuta has triggered major political upheaval in Spain: The conservative “Partido Popular” (PP) and the right-wing populist party Vox have seen significant gains. According to a recent poll by the 40dB Institute, the PP would receive 32.4 percent of the vote, while Vox would receive 17.8 percent. The “Ceuta effect” would give both parties more than 50 percent of the vote for the first time. Notably, 27 percent of Spaniards believe that Vox is best equipped to handle the issue of migration—the highest figure among all parties.

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Vox pursues a radical immigration policy that appears to be gaining more and more support. Under this policy, all people who enter Spain illegally are to be immediately deported to their countries of origin. This also applies to unaccompanied minor refugees. Even those who entered Spain legally are to leave the country if they do not adapt or if they live permanently on government assistance instead of working. In addition, Vox is demanding that Brussels return decision-making authority to the individual member states. The PP has so far taken a more moderate stance. For example, it has spoken out against the immediate deportation of unaccompanied minors. Immigration should be geared toward the actual needs of the Spanish labor market.

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Yet Vox’s influence is growing. In several regions of the country, the PP and Vox are governing together. In the autonomous community of Aragón, the coalition partners demanded: “A firm rejection of the central government’s immigration policy and the arrival of further illegal immigrants, both adults and minors.” For the 2027 parliamentary election, this means that Vox could become the PP’s pacesetter, at least on immigration policy.

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Although Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk's pro-European tripartite coalition is currently firmly in the saddle, its migration policy is driven by the right-wing populist “Law and Justice” (PiS) party. Under pressure from PiS, which still has the largest parliamentary group, Tusk agreed on exceptions to EU refugee redistribution in the summer. The PiS, led by hardliner Jarosław Kaczyński, vehemently opposes the EU’s Asylum and Migration Pact (GEAS). The party insists on national sovereignty and resists further EU integration.

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With a view to the 2027 parliamentary elections, the Civic Coalition (KO) led by Tusk is currently doing well. However, President Karol Nawrocki, supported by the PiS, is blocking key reform plans by the parliamentary majority with his right of veto. According to recent polls, the KO stands at 31.4 percent, while the PiS stands at 22.0 percent. The Kaczyński party is also grappling with internal turmoil: Former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki founded the new “Development Plus” faction, which split from the PiS in protest against its radical right-wing course. On the far right, the pro-Russian party “Konfederacja” has established itself and currently stands at 14.5 percent in the polls. In Poland, there is already speculation about a possible collaboration between PiS and “Konfederacja,” which is keeping pressure high on the political center.

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Conclusion: The political climate in Europe continues to shift to the right, particularly with regard to border security and immigration policy. More radical positions are finding greater resonance than in the past. Right-wing populist parties, which also seek to transfer more powers from the EU headquarters to the nation-states, are gaining support. The idea of the European Union—which, as a consequence of World War II, envisioned ever-greater integration—is losing acceptance. In light of next year’s elections, Europe faces a stress test. The continent’s political stability is coming under pressure.