By Milán Dóka

Viktor Orbán’s 16-year regime came to an end with a speed that hardly anyone had anticipated. Until the very last moment, it appeared stable and self-assured. Then the first results came in: Two hours later, Viktor Orbán was already congratulating his opponent, took the stage, conceded defeat, and left. Cut.
Fidesz voters have been completely at a loss ever since, as they were told right up until the end that the party was clearly in the lead, while polls suggesting otherwise were dismissed as propaganda. Government officials and influential voices within the party have yet to offer an explanation for the defeat. Yet this sense of bewilderment also characterized the other side—despite all the understandable euphoria. The events of Sunday evening also came as a surprise to the camp of those seeking a change in government.
Autocracy but not dictatorship
The Tisza Party’s victory was not surprising in itself—but Viktor Orbán’s reaction was all the more so. Hardly any of the pre-election analyses or expert assessments had anticipated that the Hungarian prime minister would congratulate his opponent and concede defeat on election night. The scenarios were varied: postponing the election, declaring a state of emergency, refusing to hand over power by citing foreign interference or alleged unrest, or taking legal steps to challenge the election results—and thereby delaying the change of government and perpetuating an uncertain situation. There was also speculation that, in the event of an election defeat, Fidesz, with its two-thirds majority, would have sufficient means to make governing considerably more difficult for the next government—for example, by expanding the powers of the president.
These assumptions were not unfounded. During the election campaign, there seemed to be no real limits for Fidesz: smear campaigns, criminal proceedings, unprecedented external influence—including from Russia—as well as vote-buying and intimidation were all part of their arsenal. All of this made the fear seem real that those in power would not relinquish control even after a defeat.
In the end, however, the decisive red line was not crossed. Why this was the case will be the subject of debate for a long time to come. In my view, it ultimately came down to the clarity of the election results. Approximately 3.2 million Hungarian citizens voted for the Tisza Party, which, as things stand, won 93 of the 106 direct mandates. No party has achieved such a clear victory since the fall of communism—not even Fidesz. It is a mandate of such magnitude that Viktor Orbán ultimately did not dare to engage in open confrontation. This does not undo the system’s failings, but his final decision will help ensure that he does not go down in history as a dictator or as the first illegitimate head of government in the EU.
A message to Europe
The decision made by Hungarian voters extends beyond the country’s borders. It sends the message that autocratic systems can also be voted out through democratic means. Distortions in the electoral system, the overwhelming power of state propaganda, or external influence do not make political change impossible—provided the will of the voters is clear enough.
Péter Magyar and the political movement he built played a key role in this, rapidly emerging as a dominant force. An analysis of this phenomenon is still pending, but the outcome is already clear. Presumably, a multitude of political science studies will yet address it.
But the Hungarian message is clear. What is needed is not the banning of parties, but the consolidation and enforcement of the will of the voters. Unity. With this unity, right-wing populism as well as Russian and even American influence can be pushed back. It is precisely this unity that Europe also needs—a place to which Hungary has now returned.