By Fariborz Saremi and Mirko Wittwar

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The recent widespread protests by the Iranian population against the mullah regime are once again drawing attention to Iran, whose importance as a powerful regional power that ultimately wants to control the entire Middle East, but also as one of Russia's most important allies, should not be underestimated. In addition, the country poses an immediate threat to Israel. In this regard, Germany has not achieved any of its self-imposed goals with its policy to date. The violent protests, in which a large number of demonstrators have already died as a result of the brutal actions of the security forces, are therefore also a reason to consider a new German policy toward Iran.

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Since the mullahs seized power in 1979, Germany's policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran has been characterized by two poles: on the one hand, maintaining the greatest possible distance from a theocratic regime whose democratic institutions are nothing more than a facade; on the other hand, maintaining regular diplomatic and economic relations, based on the pragmatic argument that otherwise there would be no possibility of exerting any influence at all. However, attempts to pursue a constructive policy toward the Iranian leadership have so far failed to prevent Iran from intensifying its attempts to destabilize the Middle East and thus gain control. For example, the Iranian leadership was actively involved in Hamas' attack on Israel in October 2023.

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The mullah regime also strives to acquire nuclear weapons; at least, its tenacious adherence to a completely oversized nuclear program allows no other conclusion. It supports international and regional terrorism, abductions of foreign citizens and even murder, including arbitrary death sentences, a close economic and military alliance with a Russia that must be regarded as openly hostile from a European perspective, and membership of the Russia-China constellation of powers, whose behavior is characterized by an attempt to aggressively undermine the democratic world. Internally, the Iranian leadership is ruthlessly oppressing its own population, which, according to all knowledge, rejects the regime by a large majority.

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Since the policy toward Iran in recent decades was intended to prevent or at least moderate precisely this development, it must be soberly acknowledged that this foreign policy approach has failed. The hoped-for opportunities for influence have proven illusory. The mullah regime has never truly recognized the Western European democratic approach of a rules-based international order, and there is not the slightest indication that this could change.

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Suspension of diplomatic relations between Germany and Iran as an option

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Future German policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran must be guided by the following insight: a regime that knows nothing but the language of violence, even toward its own citizens, defines itself exclusively in terms of its own strength and the weakness of others. It perceives itself as strong and relies on demonstrating its own strength, while others are perceived as weak and their weakness is demonstrated to them. In this sense, concessions are fundamentally interpreted as weakness. The response is accordingly further demands and aggression. The conclusion is that a new German policy toward Iran must focus on confrontation rather than cooperation and concessions. Faced with a regime that accepts only strength, Germany and Europe must demonstrate their own power through actions, not words. It was therefore an important and correct step by the E-3 (Germany, France, Great Britain) to trigger the snapback mechanism – the automatic imposition of sanctions for violations of the nuclear deal. However, this can only be a first step. Further steps could include the following:

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- Listing the Revolutionary Guards as the terrorist organization they have been since their inception.

- Reducing all economic ties with the Islamic Republic to the point of complete cessation; ending all promotion of such ties. This must also apply to humanitarian aid, as this is only abused by the regime anyway, either indirectly to strengthen its own position at home or directly by channelling the relevant financial resources into the regime's coffers instead of humanitarian measures.

- Strict control of the regime's diplomatic institutions, including those operating as religious institutions; Immediate sanctions for violations or abuse of diplomatic status – closure of consulates, expulsion of diplomats; ban on non-diplomatic institutions of the regime such as lobby and interest groups; the suspension, not necessarily the severance, of diplomatic relations must be an option – the suspension of diplomatic relations with Syria under the Assad regime could serve as a model here.

- A general ban on entry and residence for regime officials and their family members.

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This list does not claim to be exhaustive, but is intended to indicate the direction in which future German policy toward Iran must move. The principle must be to tighten the screws as far as possible. Short-term disadvantages must be accepted if necessary in order to prevent even greater damage in the long term than has already been done. Given Germany's disproportionate economic superiority, such disadvantages would be very limited – Germany does not need Iran, which in turn is dependent on international cooperation in the long term.

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Promote alienation between regime and population

The mullah regime consists of religious fanatics who believe they are carrying out a higher will. Such people do not deviate from their once-set goals; any concessions they make are always tactical in nature and serve to overcome difficult situations in the short term or to lull their opponents into a false sense of security so that they can continue to pursue their own plans undisturbed. Any assumption that peaceful coexistence with this regime is possible in the long term is an illusion, as confirmed by past experience.

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Traditional diplomacy always serves self-interested purposes and is by no means fundamentally characterized by honesty. Ultimately, however, it pursues constructive goals in the sense that it strives to find solutions that are acceptable to all parties involved. In the case of the Iranian leadership, however, we are dealing with religiously driven irrationality that does not pursue reasonable goals and is impervious to rational arguments. Furthermore, this irrationality pursues destructive goals based on ideas of domination over others (peoples of the region, etc.) or their destruction (e.g., Israel, other religions, or non-Shiite Islam). The crucial mistake of German and Western policy toward Iran in recent decades was that this was not recognized and it was believed that a balance of interests based on reason was possible. German policy toward Iran must abandon this illusion; the complete failure of this policy speaks for itself.

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The strategic goal must ultimately be the overthrow of the regime. This cannot be achieved by Germany alone, and most likely cannot be achieved from outside at all. What can be promoted from outside, however, is the further alienation and delegitimization of the regime in the eyes of the Iranian people. It would be a big mistake to equate the regime with the population. Nevertheless, measures that also have negative effects on the population will be unavoidable. On the contrary, it is precisely the serious consequences for the lives of the people in Iran that make them realize that the regime is neither willing nor able to guarantee even the most basic necessities of life for the population, which further increases the domestic political pressure under which the Iranian leadership is already operating. This, together with the strategic goal mentioned above, must be the guiding principles for future German policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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The power of conservative bazaaris

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The current protests by the Iranian people against the mullah regime confirm the validity of this approach. The Islamic Republic of Iran has long been under considerable pressure from sanctions, which have so far failed to bring about any real concessions from the country's leadership. However, the current wave of protests is directly attributable to Iran's catastrophic economic situation caused by sanctions. The protests arose explicitly from the recent collapse of the already very weak Iranian currency and differ from previous protests in two main respects:

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- The trigger was a strike by the bazaaris, the Iranian bazaar traders. This group is traditionally influential, but more conservative-religious and sometimes also has personal and familial ties with the rulers. This group, whose participation in the protests of 1979 contributed significantly to the fall of the Shah, is now apparently turning away because it is directly affected by the collapse of the currency. As retailers, they are no longer able to calculate their prices with any degree of reliability in the face of runaway inflation, as one of their representatives explicitly stated, which ultimately threatens their economic existence. If this situation continues and the Iranian leadership loses the support of this group, which is actually well-disposed towards it, the last foundations of its position of power will be in grave danger.

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- Unlike in the recent past, the protests are not only taking place in major cities such as Tehran and other large cities, but are particularly virulent in rural areas and smaller towns, which are actually more conservative and religious. These regions have also been a largely reliable support for the regime up to now, but this now seems to be changing. There, too, the protesters cite the economic situation as the reason for their protests.

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With the caveat that, due to the internet blackout, only a few news reports are coming out of Iran, it seems that the protests are gradually taking on the characteristics of an open uprising: police stations and government buildings are being set on fire, and the government has had to admit that there are also injuries and deaths among the security forces. This suggests that the regime is beginning to lose control, at least in part. It is clear that the economic situation is now restricting the daily lives of the general population to such an extent that the regime is beginning to lose support even among the circles on which it has relied until now. The mullah regime is increasingly losing its legitimacy.

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It is difficult to say whether the regime will be able to hold on to power or whether its downfall is imminent. However, developments in recent days show that, contrary to previous impressions, a policy of strict sanctions can ultimately have a significant effect. This policy must be continued and significantly tightened, as it is proving its effectiveness right now.

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The authors: ‍

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Farborz Saremi is a political scientist with a doctorate in international relations from Boston University. In exile in Germany, he is involved in a number of activities, including as coordinator of the opposition Iranian National Unity Movement in Hamburg and as an Iran expert in the CDU in the Hanseatic city.

Literary scholar Mirko Wittwar works as a translator of academic literature and, as an analyst, focuses primarily on Middle East and security policy issues. Among other works, he wrote the book “The State of Israel—A Tragedy. An Attempt to Solve an Unsolvable Problem.”