By Christian Moos

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The modern rules-based international order, institutionally embodied by the United Nations, is not a state of nature. It is a geopolitical construct—created, sustained, and enforced by the United States of America. Its actual scope has always been limited to the extent that the U.S. and its allies were willing and able to guarantee it.

In the Soviet sphere of influence—that is, in the unfree part of Europe—it found little application. In its understanding of legal obligation, multilateral conflict resolution, and a liberal economic order, it stood rather in the tradition of the British Empire’s order: an Anglo-Saxon-shaped world order, not the realization of a global republic. That its actual founding document was the Atlantic Charter of 1941 is therefore no coincidence, but rather an expression of its ideological and power-political origins.

The UN as a Reflection of the Balance of Power

The United Nations is, and has always been, nothing more and nothing less than a reflection of the balance of power. It has been unable to stop proxy wars and violations of international law. Only when the superpowers shared a common interest could a conflict be contained. One such moment, particularly pivotal for Europe, was the Suez Crisis of 1956: Washington and Moscow, otherwise bitter enemies, both sought—for different reasons—a return to the status quo ante, and the U.S. pressured Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from Egypt. The fact that the two European powers had to yield to massive pressure exposed their global powerlessness. Their veto power in the Security Council remained henceforth a formal privilege without strategic weight.

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To put it even more plainly: The rules-based order functioned as long as a benevolent hegemon guaranteed it and the bipolarity of the Cold War effectively froze it along its East-West fault lines—Europe and the Korean Peninsula—almost in the spirit of “cuius regio, eius religio,” so to speak. It was also in the Soviet Union’s interest to keep this order outside its own sphere of influence, because while rule violations remained possible, these rules simultaneously enabled face-saving de-escalation mechanisms in systemic conflict—mechanisms that, for example, helped prevent World War III during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nevertheless, the rules-based order was unable to prevent either the escalation of the Indochina War into the Vietnam War or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to name just two prominent examples of so-called proxy wars on the southern periphery.

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China as a maritime and trading power …

In the world of the early 21st century, this inherently imperfect order exists only in theory. The United Nations system has undergone a fundamental transformation since the end of the Cold War, through the brief unipolar period in which the United States stood as the sole remaining world power, and up to China’s rapid rise as its challenger. In 1945, China was a country ravaged by war with Japan and on the brink of another civil war; after the Communists seized power, it was initially isolated internationally and later became an adversary of the Soviet Union.

In 1971, the People’s Republic became a member of the Security Council and, thanks to parallel efforts in American backchannel diplomacy, saw its international standing significantly enhanced a year later. Following Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1979, China gained international prestige despite the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. However, U.S. President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia,” some thirty years after China’s strategic shift, symbolizes a turning point. China’s rapid rise—often referred to as the Thucydides Trap, drawing parallels to Athens and Sparta in the Peloponnesian War—has made it the United States’ central strategic rival.

The United States has been increasingly withdrawing from the United Nations, at least since Trump’s first presidency—thereby opening the door for China to gain growing influence and room to maneuver within the system. Europe viewed China—which around 2012 intensified its authoritarianism and began to project a more aggressive image abroad, particularly but by no means exclusively with regard to Taiwan—as an economic El Dorado for much longer than the U.S. did, yet largely ignored the risks associated with its rise.

… and as a self-assured veto power

Today, China is a self-assured veto power that exerts a decisive influence on the United Nations. Yet Beijing only ostensibly uses this position to strengthen the universal legal order. When Xi speaks of multilateralism, he means multipolarity. China seeks to impose its own principles through the United Nations: the right to development coupled with strict non-interference, state sovereignty as the supreme good, and the vision of a multipolar world in which international norms are subject to power-political interpretation.

China’s policy of vetoes and obstruction, along with its “partnership without borders” with Russia—declared in direct connection with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine—has further limited the United Nations’ ability to act, just as the accelerating withdrawal of the U.S. from the international community has. Yet China and the U.S. do not constitute a new bipolarity. Unlike during the Cold War era between 1946 (Kennan’s Long Telegram, Churchill’s Fulton Speech) and 1986 (Reykjavik Summit, INF Treaty), the world is no longer bipolar.

Europe without the means of power, without unity

The EU nevertheless seems to be banking on the idea that the rules-based order established in 1945—which has, in fact, been eroding for decades—can be sustained. Unlike the United States, however, Europe possesses neither the necessary means of power nor the strategic unity to preserve or restore this order. At the same time, the U.S. is not only withdrawing in the classic isolationist tradition but is acting increasingly erratically and aggressively.

Contrary to what is often claimed, the “Trump Corollary”—as the American president himself has called it—has little in common with the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which was essentially defensive in nature. The foreign policy of the second Trump administration is explicitly offensive and confrontational, calling into question alliances—in the case of NATO, in a manner that is existential for Europe—and international law, which is why the order that the U.S. itself created, shaped, occasionally violated, but ultimately preserved, no longer exists. Europe looks on at these developments largely powerless—accompanied by the US president’s staccato attacks via Truth Social, which accelerate the collapse of the order.

Spectator rather than actor

The conflicts in the Middle East, in particular, make Europe’s powerlessness painfully evident. Iran oppresses its own people, destabilizes the region through proxies, spreads terror, and seeks nuclear capabilities—the acquisition of which cannot be accepted given its openly declared intent to destroy Israel. Yet even if the war aims of the U.S. and Israel were legitimate and clearly defined, it remains doubtful whether they are achievable—and whether the negative consequences of this war will not outweigh its potential benefits. Europe can hardly influence any of this; it is a spectator, not a player.

The same applies to the War on Gaza, which Hamas sparked with its attack on Israel—supported by Iran and other regional proxy forces. Europe’s influence tends toward zero. And as long as the United States shows no consistent interest in defending international law, it will be all the more difficult for Europe to exert a moderating influence on Israel’s policies: not to question its legitimate right to self-defense, but to limit disproportionate actions that isolate Israel internationally and undermine its long-term security.

Furthermore, Turkey and the Gulf states, too, demonstrate through their foreign policies—for example, in Yemen and Sudan—no willingness whatsoever to respect international law when it does not serve their interests. These states, as well, act in terms of power politics; when it comes to international law, they are selective at best, not normative. The lesson here is bitter but clear: only an order whose observance is secured by credible, strong guarantor powers can ensure international law. Moral appeals are no substitute for the projection of power.

An order that no longer exists

This diagnosis leads to an uncomfortable but unavoidable conclusion: Europe can no longer derive its security, its interests, and its political agency from an order that no longer exists. It is not enough to join forces with other middle powers that have likewise benefited from the Pax Americana, which has always been selective and driven by self-interest. Cooperation is no substitute for a power base. Even the considerable weight the EU brings to bear in trade policy cannot alter this reality.

The trade agreements recently concluded offer a glimmer of hope. However, the problems the EU faces in fully implementing them point to shortcomings in its internal structure. Furthermore, free trade depends on a stable international order, such as open sea lanes. Just as a phase of globalization came to an end in 1914, the recent wave of globalization has ended—at least for now—with the collapse of the Pax Americana.

NATO undermined

It is not as though these developments have gone unnoticed in Europe. For years, efforts have been made to respond to the dwindling reliability of American security guarantees under the banner of “strategic autonomy.” Trump’s second presidency has significantly accelerated this process, not out of European strength, but out of external pressure. At the same time, NATO—an alliance whose military and political capacity to act relied heavily on American power, leadership, and reliability—is structurally damaged. Without a stable strategic anchor in Washington, it loses its character as a credible security promise.

What Europe lacks is not an understanding of this situation, but the political and institutional framework needed to deal with the autonomy that is inevitably being demanded. There is a lack of strategic unity, clear priorities, and a shared vision of how European security, power projection, and political order should be ensured in the 21st century. Autonomy is demanded rhetorically, but shunned institutionally and in terms of power politics. Europe possesses neither a coherent strategy nor the necessary decision-making and enforcement mechanisms to organize its own security and development independently, credibly, and sustainably.

The potential is there

Yet Europe has the potential to do so. It would simply have to learn from history. 250 years ago, the British colonies in North America declared their independence. They quickly realized that mere cooperation was not enough to secure their independence. As a loose confederation, they were not viable: they found themselves caught between competing great powers—Great Britain, France, and Spain—while the protection of their trade routes and security previously provided by the Empire and its Navy had ceased.

It was only the decisive step toward a genuine union that fundamentally changed their strategic situation. A common foreign and security policy, the establishment of their own armed forces and a powerful navy, a unified economic and financial system, and an executive branch capable of taking decisive action transformed the former colonies into a sovereign actor. The American Constitution was far more than an idealistic unification project. It was a pragmatic, power-political response to a hostile environment. Sovereignty emerged less from shared values than from institutionalized decision-making and enforcement capabilities.

No regard for values

Europe stands at a comparable historical crossroads today. Here, too, cooperation and values that prove hardly resilient in times of crisis are no longer enough. In a world of systemic rivalry between the United States, China, and Russia, a politically fragmented Europe is at a structural disadvantage. The United States is acting with increasing unpredictability, no longer as a partner but as an adversary. China is expanding its global influence just as deliberately, even at the expense of European interests. Russia openly relies on military force and revisionist power politics. None of these actors waits for European decision-making processes or considerations.

Without uniting into a political community worthy of the name, Europe will be unable to preserve its freedom, its prosperity, or its values. The alternative to political unity is not some other, more stable alliance, but a creeping loss of autonomy—and ultimately, subjugation to outside powers or worse. A Europe that remains dependent on others for security, militarily fragmented, and strategically divided will become the object of decisions made by others, not a participant in shaping them.

Self-blockade and signals of weakness

Decision-making mechanisms based on national veto powers and consensual self-blockade are unsuitable for a world of strategic competition. They prevent decisive action, delay responses, and signal weakness. A merely better-coordinated foreign and security policy within existing structures—even the elimination of the veto power held by individual EU member states—is no longer sufficient. Europe needs an executive branch capable of taking action that follows a unified overall strategy—politically, economically, technologically, and militarily—and a strong supranational legislative branch that ensures the democratic legitimacy of the European Grand Strategy.

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Without a federal European constitution, this is inconceivable. Sovereignty cannot be conjured up; it must be institutionally organized. Europe faces existential challenges not only in the East, even if the greatest immediate danger is currently visible there. The real decision is more fundamental: whether Europe will take the step from a cooperation-based confederation of states to a sovereign political actor—or whether it will let this historic moment slip by and leave its future to others.

Europe’s task will be to work together with middle powers, friendly democracies around the world, and an emerging India—which plays a key role simply by virtue of its demographic and economic weight—to ensure that the rivalry between China and the United States neither escalates nor results in a Sino-American balance of power at Europe’s expense. Europe must become an anchor of stability, a strategic mediator. This can only succeed through a powerful European federation. Trade agreements are of central importance. However, they alone will not guarantee a new stability in the international order. The latter is the prerequisite for a peaceful, prosperous world that benefits from free trade.

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Honesty in EU enlargement

Europe must also be honest about the issue of enlargement. The candidate countries urgently need to be integrated into the European system. However, they cannot join the EU in its current form, nor can they immediately join a European federation, which requires a higher level of already established common standards as a prerequisite. Ukraine must be integrated into the single market, but cannot simply join the common agricultural market. Above all, it needs security guarantees and lasting material support for its defense capabilities—and this must function even without the United States.

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However, a stable European order requires more than peace and security for Ukraine, as well as the accompanying effective deterrence and—in the longer term—the face-saving reintegration of a non-aggressive Russia into a stable European order. What is needed, rather, is a new integration architecture that also includes those states that are closely linked to Europe but are not willing or able to become members of a federal union in the short term.

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A ring of closely allied states

A preliminary political union presents itself here: a ring of closely allied states. In the long term, it could encompass both the United Kingdom—particularly as a privileged security partner with its legitimate need for political independence—as well as parts of the Western Balkans and those EU member states that do not wish to join a federal union.

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Such a structure would increase Europe’s geopolitical depth, stabilize its periphery, and at the same time define clear external borders for the federation. It would create a buffer zone that promotes Eurasian stability without overstretching the federal core structure. This core structure—the federal state—would thereby exert considerable gravitational pull and provide a counterweight to Russia that would stabilize the European system in the long term. Germany, as the “central power of Europe,” must be a constitutive part of this federal state.

Europe needs a Federal State

To address all geopolitical challenges—the eastern flank, transatlantic relations, the U.S.-China rivalry, China itself, Africa, and the Arctic, etc.—Europe needs a federal state. And this federal state, in turn, needs greater internal balance and a shared socio-political orientation that ensures cohesion and a shared vision of the future, despite all the differences among today’s EU member states.

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It is not only foreign and security policy considerations that argue in favor of a European federation. The demographic and socioeconomic challenges facing the member states are so immense that they can hardly be managed by individual nation-states anymore.

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Europe can only survive if it unites—as the American colonies once did after gaining independence—to form a United States. A federal order is the prerequisite for Europe to shape its own interests and help shape a new order with its own rules: externally through clear borders and strategic stability, internally through political unity and the ability to act.

Otherwise, Europe faces, at best, irrelevance; more likely, foreign domination and renewed division; and, at worst, chaos.

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The author is Secretary General of Europa-Union Deutschland, Berlin. Opinion pieces by guest authors do not necessarily reflect the views of the diplo.news editorial team.

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